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ARTICLE I LIMITS ON
STATUTORY STANDING
JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR.t
Henry James wrote that "[w]e must grant the artist his
subject, his idea, his donee: our criticism is applied only to what
he makes of it."1 Dean Nichol and Professor Pierce lose sight of
this principle in their criticism of Justice Scalia's opinion for the
majority in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.' One of the
"donees"-the givens-in Defenders was that injury in fact is
required for standing under Article III. The Court's precedents so
hold,3 and none of the parties before the Court disputed the
proposition. It certainly is fair to challenge this premise, and also
fair to challenge the reasoning of the opinion in light of the
premise. What strikes me as a bit above the odds, however, is
challenging the reasoning of the opinion in light of a different
premise-the premise that injury is not an Article III requirement.
The result is somewhat like criticizing a person for speaking awful
French, only to discover that he was in fact speaking fluent
Spanish. Defenders is a sound and straightforward decision
applying the Article III injury requirement. The fact that it fails as
t Partner, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C. The author served as Principal
Deputy Solicitor General, United States Department of Justice, 1989-1993.
The Office of the Solicitor General represented Secretary of the Interior Manuel
Lujan before the U.S. Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130
(1992), and the author argued Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), on
his behalf.
This Comment is based on remarks presented at a symposium on Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife held at Duke University School of Law on January 21, 1993.
1. Henry James, The Art of Fiction, in THE PORTABLE HENRY JAMES 387, 402-03
(Morton D. Zabel ed., 1968).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
3. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) ("To establish an Art.
III case or controversy, a litigant must first clearly demonstrate that he has suffered an
'injury in fact.' "); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984); Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-76
(1982).
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an application of some other, non-constitutional concept of injury
Dean Nichol prefers should come as no surprise.
Before considering whether Defenders is "a transformation in
the law of standing"4 that is "inconsistent with the principle .of
judicial restraint,"5 it may be worthwhile to recall that the
Supreme Court for some time has recognized standing as a
constitutionally based doctrine designed to implement the Framers'
concept of "the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts
in a democratic society."6 The legitimacy of an unelected, life-
tenured judiciary in our democratic republic is bolstered by the
constitutional limitation of that judiciary's power in Article III to
actual "cases" and "controversies." The need to resolve such an
actual case or controversy provides the justification not only for
judicial review over the popularly elected and accountable
branches of the federal government,. but also for the exercise of
judicial power itself, "which can so profoundly affect the lives,
liberty, and property of those to whom it extends."' This is
nothing new; the Court explained a century ago that the exercise
of federal judicial power was legitimate only "as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy." 9
One way federal courts ensure that they have a "real, earnest,
and vital controversy" before them is by testing the plaintiff's
standing to bring suit. The plaintiff must allege at the pleading
stage,10 and later prove,11 an injury that is fairly traceable to the
defendant's challenged conduct and that is likely to be redressed
by the relief sought.12 If the plaintiff cannot do so, the court
must dismiss the case as beyond its power to decide-no matter
4. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
LJ 1141, 1142 (1993).
5. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing As a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE LJ. 1170, 1200 (1993).
6. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); see
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-76.
7. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473.
9. Chicago & Grand Trunk R.R. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892), quoted in
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471.
10. Se, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7 (1988); Warth, 422 U.S. at
501.
11. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990); Warth, 422 U.S. at
501; United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973).
12. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
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when in the litigation the flaw is discovered or arises. 13 A dis-
missal on the basis of standing prevents the court from reaching
and deciding the merits of the case, whether for the plaintiff or
the defendant. Standing is thus properly regarded as a doctrine of
judicial self-restraint."'
The Defenders Court engaged in just such an exercise of
judicial self-restraint, soundly based on precedent. The Court
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove injury in fact' - -
hardly a surprising result under the Court's standing precedents,
given the vague and amorphous nature of ihe plaintiff's claims of
injury. The Court then concluded that Congress nonetheless
intended the plaintiff to have a right to sue under the statute in
question. 6 Although I regard this ruling as more problematic, 7
the conclusion that so surprises Dean Nichol and Professor
Pierce-that the Endangered Species Act is therefore unconstitu-
tional as applied to this particular plaintiff in this particular
lawsuit-follows inexorably, and is no less an act of judicial self-
restraint than any other dismissal on the basis of standing.
Dean Nichol first faults the Court for failing to overturn
established precedent and rule that injury in fact is not, after all, a
requirement of Article III. According to Dean Nichol, James
Madison's statement that the federal courts would be limited to
matters of "a Judiciary nature" was "obviously circular," and
historical scholarship has shown that the injury requirement is not
constitutionally based.19 A response to the historical scholarship is
beyond the scope of this Comment.20 The Framers recognized
13. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986); cf. Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1987) (analyzing de-
velopment of lack of standing during pendency of case in terms of mootness).
14. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)
("Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial
power."). This point is true whether or not the standing decision is correct in any partic-
ular case. If a court errs in its standing dismissal and should have reached the merits,
that court is wrong-not activist.
15. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1992).
16. IL at 2145.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
18. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966).
19. Nichol, supra note 4, at 1150-52.
20. I would note, however, that Dean Nichol's confidence in the constitutionality of
qui tam actions is not universally shared. The question is currently pending before the
122119931
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that legislative, executive, and judicial functions were not divided
into hard and fast categories, but, as Justice Scalia noted in
Defenders, the "landmarks" defining the tasks of the judiciary are
"less uncertain" than those delimiting the responsibilities of the
other branches.21 There are landmarks-the inquiry is not
circular.
In any event, the objection to the Court's refusal to abandon
injury as an Article III element of standing is a curious one in a
discussion otherwise critical - of supposed judicial activism. The
Court has recognized the constitutional nature of the injury
requirement for some time, certainly before Justice Scalia's
appointment to the Supreme Court.' As Dean Nichol notes, the
academic community is less convinced,' but the Court is firmly
committed. No party before the Court in Defenders suggested
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. United States ex rel. Madden v. General
Dynamics, No. CV-88-05352-WMB (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 6, 1988), petition for permission
to appeal granted, No. 92-56042 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1992); United States ex rel. Kelly v.
The Boeing Co., No. CV-89-1732-R (W.D. Wash. filed Nov. 30, 1989), petition for per-
mission to appeal granted, No. 92-3660 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 1992). The Office of Legal
Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice has formally opined that such actions are
unconstitutional. See Constitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act,
13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 249 (1989) (preliminary print). In any event, reliance on "the
business of the Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the Constitution was
framed," .Nichol, supra note 4, at 1151 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)), must be tempered with
a recognition that the Framers were moving from a unitary system of government to one
of separated powers, a move with consequences for the judiciary as well as for the other
branches of government. Practice prior to the framing of the Constitution-and perhaps
constitutionally dubious remnants persisting thereafter-thus is not an infallible guide to
the scope of judicial power under Article III. See Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) ("The re-
quirements of Art. III are not satisfied merely because a party requests a court of the
United States to declare its legal rights, and has couched that request for forms of relief
historically associated with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those
trained in the legal process.").
21. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
22. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 123 (3d ed. 1988) ("The cases have long accepted the prin-
ciple that Article III itself requires the plaintiff to show that he was injured by the con-
duct under challenge.").
23. Nichol, supra note 4, at 1151-52; see, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in
Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 839 (1969); Louis
L. Jaffee, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1044 (1968); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Pri-
vatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1474-80 (1988); Steven L. Winter,
The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,
1395-96 (1988).
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abandoning the requirement. It certainly would have been an
extraordinary adventure in judicial activism for the Court suddenly
to change directions, overrule numerous precedents, and announce,
uninvited, that it no longer regarded the injury requirement as an
Article III restriction.
Dean Nichol's next criticism is, like the foregoing one, more a
criticism of the Court's standing jurisprudence in general than of
the Defenders opinion in particular. Invoking Hindu philosophy
and Nietzsche, he notes that the task of defining injury is
"amorphous, complex, and value-laden."'24 Although it is easier to
define injury in some cases than in others, the occasional difficulty
of the enterprise is hardly reason to abandon it altogether-to
throw up one's hands and announce that an injury standard "can
have no ascertainable meaning."'  As the Court has explained,
"[t]he absence of precise definitions ... hardly leaves courts at
sea in applying the law of standing."2 6 As is the case whenever
the Court defines a legal requirement, "the standing concepts have
gained considerable definition from developing case law."27 A
lawyer looking at that caselaw will learn that the injury must be
"distinct and palpable," "concrete,, 29 "certainly impending,"'
"real and immediate,"'" and "actual or imminent, not 'conjec-
tural' or 'hypothetical."' 32 To be sure, these are not objectively
verifiable, self-defining terms in some philosophical sense. They
are, however, reasonably precise guidelines of the sort common to
the lawyer's craft.
As the Court has explained, any effort to flesh out the
concept of injury and other standing principles must be based on
"reference to the Art. III notion that federal courts may exercise
power 'only in the last resort, and as a necessity,' and only when
24. Nichol, supra note 4, at 1154-55, 1157.
25. Id. at 1157-58.
26. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
27. Id.
28. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
29. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 166, 176-78 (1974).
30. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979).
31. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).
32. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at
101-02).
1993] 1223
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
adjudication is 'consistent with a system of separated powers and
[the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of
resolution through the judicial process.' ' 3 Dean Nichol greets
this enterprise with skepticism, but that is to be expected given his
view that the injury requirement is not found in Article III in the
first place. The need to insist upon meaningful limitations on what
constitutes injury for standing purposes-regardless of what the
Hindus or Nietzsche have to say about it-flows from an
appreciation of the key role that injury plays in restricting the
courts to their proper function in a limited and separated
government.' If you do not recognize that role-if you think, as
Dean Nichol does, that the Framers were being "obviously
circular" when they "generally supposed" that the jurisdiction of
the federal courts "was constructively limited to cases of a
Judiciary nature"3 -- then you will fail to understand why the
concept of injury must be delimited and therefore not appreciate
the principle guiding the Court's developing caselaw.
The conclusion that the plaintiff in Defenders failed to satisfy
the basic Article III requirement of showing injury in fact
followed from the Court's prior precedents. 6 The only concrete
and specific showing of injury made by Defenders of Wildlife was
that, years before, two of its members had visited areas-
specifically, the habitats of the Nile crocodile and Asian
leopard-allegedly affected by funded projects. Since the plaintiff
sought prospective relief, not damages, any past injury arising from
these visits was insufficient to establish standing.37 As to the
future injury, the affiants could claim no more than that they
desired to revisit the areas at some point and were concerned that
33. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (citations omitted).
34. See Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 843, 883 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane)
(Silberman, J.) ("[W]e must be careful to delineate the 'distinct and palpable' injury
suffered lest we turn the injury component of Article III into a paper barrier and there-
by convert the federal judiciary into a referee of political disputes."), reh'g granted and
opinion vacated, 856 F.2d 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
35. 2 RECORDS, supra note 18, at 430; see Nichol, supra note 4, at 1150.
36. I agree with Professor Pierce's discussion of the treatment of standing based on
"procedural injury" in the majority opinion. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1184-86. Indeed, the
plaintiff in Defenders did not even press a claim of standing based solely on such an
injury, apart from the claimed injury in fact. See Respondent's Brief at 35 n.10,
Petitioners' Reply Brief at 2, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No.
90-1424).
37. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106 n.7 (1983).
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if the pertinent federal agencies failed to consult as required by
the Endangered Species Act, they might suffer harm-that is, an
absence of Nile crocodiles or Asian leopards-were they to return.
This is precisely the sort of "conjectural" or "hypothetical" harm
the Court has held to be insufficient to establish standing.38 As
the Court has explained, "[a]llegations of possible future injury do
not satisfy the requirements of Art. III."'
Perhaps recognizing this difficulty, Professor Pierce argues that
"the Court should not require evidentiary proof of particularized
injury as a prerequisite to judicial review of all agency actions,"'' 4
and surmises that "[a]t any given point in time, many people have
specific plans to visit the habitat of the Nile crocodile and the
Asian leopard, and most would be happy to submit an affidavit as
a member of Defenders of Wildlife."'" I am not as sure about
the latter point as Professor Pierce is; if there really are "many
people" with such specific plans who are members of the
plaintiff's organization, it is not unreasonable to wonder why the
organization relied on such weak affidavits. More importantly, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that "[i]t will not do to 'presume'
the missing facts" needed to establish standing.42 As the Court
has frequently reiterated, standing allegations "must be true and
capable of proof at trial;"43 it is not enough to rest on the
pleadings." "It is a long-settled principle that standing cannot be
'inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings,' ...
but rather 'must affirmatively appear in the record.' ,4 Standing
is, after all, a constitutional requirement. Assuming standing on
the basis of the pleadings would be tantamount to assuming
Article III jurisdiction. The proper approach is just the
38. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
39. Id. at 158.
40. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1175-76.
41. Id. at 1177.
42. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990).
43. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973).
44. See National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 889; Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 66 (1987); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02
(1975); see also Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947) ("When a question of the
District Court's jurisdiction is raised .... the court may inquire, by affidavits or other-
wise, into the facts as they exist.").
45. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (quoting Grace v.
American Central Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 284 (1883); Mansfield C. & L.M.R. Co. v.
Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
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opposite-to "presume that federal courts lack jurisdiction 'unless
"the contrary appears affirmatively from the record."' s)46
Dean Nichol's proposed solution to the occasional difficulties
in defining injury-that is, leaving it to Congress-could only
come from one who, like Dean Nichol, does not regard this as a
constitutional problem in the first place. If, as the Court has
repeatedly reiterated, the standing requirement is a constitutional
limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it is a limitation
that Congress as well as the courts must respect. The Court has
said so in the plainest possible terms:
Congress may, by legislation, expand standing to the full extent
permitted by Art. III, thus permitting litigation by one "who
otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules." In no
event, however, may Congress abrogafe the Art. III minima: A
plaintiff must always have suffered "a distinct and palpable injury
to himself," that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is
granted.47
If Congress directs the federal courts to hear a case in which
the requirements of Article III are not met, that Act of Congress
is unconstitutional. Defenders is apparently the first Supreme Court
case to so hold because of lack of Article III standing,48 but the
conclusion that Article III limits congressional power can hardly be
regarded as remarkable.
46. Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331, 2336 (1991) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport
Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986); King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U.S.
225, 226 (1887)).
47. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (quoting
Warth, 422 U.S. at 501); see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 488 n.24 (1982) ("Neither the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, nor any other congressional enactment, can lower the threshold re-
quirements of standing under Art. IIl.").
48. At least Defenders is the first holding to be accompanied by an opinion. The
three-judge district court in McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho), affd, 454
U.S. 1025 (1981), rejected on standing grounds a U.S. senator's challenge to a judicial
appointment, even though an Act of Congress specifically gave "[a]ny Member of Con-
gress" the right to bring such a suit challenging the particular appointment. Id. at 266
n.1. After concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing because of lack of injury, the
court held that the language of the statute could not alter that conclusion: "It is difficult
to see how this statute may, consistent with article 11, confer upon a senator or member
of the House of Representatives a 'right' to seek a decision from a federal court that
such a senator or member of the House would otherwise be powerless to procure." Id.
at 271.
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On the other hand, a holding that Congress may override the
injury limitation of Article III would have been both remarkable
and particularly unfortunate in Defenders, because there is no
indication that Congress embarked on such an ambitious undertak-
ing when it enacted the Endangered Species Act. The citizen suit
provision does indeed authorize "any person" to bring suit and
defines "person" in a manner that includes organizations such as
the plaintiff in Defenders.49 Under normal principles of statutory
interpretation, however, such a broad statutory grant should be
construed in a manner consistent with constitutional limitations,
including the Article III limitation that only those who suffer
actual injury have standing to sue.50 Congress made this limitation
explicit in other citizen suit provisions, which is why-contrary to
the concerns Professor Pierce expresses"-those other provisions
do not even pose the conceptual problem presented here.52 Al-
though the citizen suit provision in the Act lacks such an explicit
limitation, there is no indication that Congress thought it was
departing from the usual citizen suit pattern to test the limits of its
constitutional powers.53
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (1988); 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(13) (West Supp. 1993).
50. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S.
490, 499-501 (1979).
51. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1188-89.
52. For example, the citizen suit provision in the Clean Water Act authorizes "any
citizen" to bring suit and defines "citizen" as "a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1988). As the Court ex-
plained in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1 (1981), "[i]t is clear from the Senate Conference Report that this phrase was intended
by Congress to allow suits by all persons possessing standing under this Court's decision
in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)." Id. at 16; see Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 70-71 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (finding citizen suit provision of Clean Water Act em-
bodies constitutional requirement of injury).
53. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1045 (8th Cir. 1988) (Bow-
man, J., dissenting) (declining "to attribute to Congress the unexpressed intent to dis-
pense with standing requirements entirely .... Surely Congress did not intend this pro-
vision to be read in a vacuum, without regard to constitutional limitations"), rev'd sub
nom. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). In Defenders, the govern-
ment argued that the case did not even arise under the citizen suit provision. That provi-
sion authorizes suits against those "alleged to be in violation" of the Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1988), and an erroneous interpretation of the Act-the
gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint in Defenders-is not itself a "violation" of the Act.
The suit is instead properly viewed as arising under the Administrative Procedure Act,
which limits suit to those who are "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the action in
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The Court has recognized that the requisite Article III injury
"may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing."' 4 The Court in Defenders
explained that its prior cases applying this principle were consis-
tent with the injury in fact requirement, because in those cases the
statutes in question elevated injuries that were not previously
legally cognizable to the status of legally enforceable rights.55 The
Endangered Species Act, however, is not a "statute[] creating legal
rights."56 The substantive provision at issue in Defenders simply
requires consultation among federal agencies; it does not by its
terms confer legal rights on private persons. 7 Nor does the citi-
zen suit provision' create rights the invasion of which creates
standing; it simply authorizes suit to vindicate rights which must be
found elsewhere.5 9 As stated above, the consultation provisions
which the plaintiff in Defenders invoked create no such rights."
question-i.e., those whose injury "falls within the 'zone of interests' sought to be pro-
tected by statutory provisions whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint." 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1988); see Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990).
54. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2145 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500
(1975)); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
55. See Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2145-46 (discussing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) and Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968)).
56. See id. at 2145 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (quoting Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at
617 n.3)).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
58. Id. § 1540(g).
59. See Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (stating that citizen suit provision "does not of its own
force establish that there is an injury in 'any person' by virtue of 'any violation' "); see
also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 488 n.24 (1982) (noting that Administrative Procedure Act provision
authorizing any person "adversely affected or aggrieved" by agency action to bring suit
does not create legal rights).
60. Contrary to Professor Pierce's concern, nothing in Defenders casts doubt on the
constitutionality of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Pierce, supra note 5, at
1189-90. Under FOIA, every person is given a right of access to nonexempt government
documents. When an agency wrongfully denies an individual's FOIA request, that particu-
lar individual has suffered injury in fact under Article III and has standing to sue in
federal court to redress that injury. FOIA authorizes just such a suit. Another individual
who has not made a disclosure request, and therefore has not suffered a wrongful denial,
has not been injured and does not have standing to sue, even if he would like to have
access to the same documents. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491
U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989) (Parties establish standing under FOIA by showing that "they
sought and were denied specific agency records .... The ...fact that numerous other
citizens might request the same information ... [does not mean] that those who have
been denied access do not possess a sufficient basis to sue.").
LIMITS ON STANDING
Recognizing that Article III is a constraint on Congress's
power to assign matters to the federal courts is not the assault on
"legislative supremacy" that Professor Pierce bemoans.6' In the
first place, the legislature is not supreme in our system of govern-
ment-the Constitution is. Holding a statute unconstitutional be-
cause it transgresses Article III is nothing more than a recognition
of that principle-a principle the Supreme Court has felt obligated
to defend since the first case holding an Act of Congress unconsti-
tutional under Article III. That case was, of course, Marbury v.
Madison,2 and although at the time some regarded Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion as an assault on legislative supremacy, it since
has been recognized as the cornerstone of the constitutional rule
of law.
More specifically, it is worth noting that a standing decision
such as Defenders in no way inhibits Congress from pursuing sub-
stantive objectives. When a court finds that an Act of Congress
violates, for example, the First Amendment, "legislative suprema-
cy" is indeed restricted, for Congress cannot do what it sought to
do. A standing decision simply means that Congress cannot enlist
the federal courts in its enterprise-and even then, it cannot do so
only because the specific plaintiff invoking the courts' authority
lacks the requisite injury. Congress is "perfectly free to cut off
funding for the Aswan Dam or Mahaweli River projects if it con-
cludes those projects threaten endangered species. It also can
exercise its oversight power if it believes agencies are not consult-
ing adequately about such effects. The one thing it may not do is
ask the courts in effect to exercise such oversight responsibility at
the behest of any John Q. Public who happens to be interested in
the issue.
Viewed in this light, standing-like other doctrines of judicial
self-restraint--compels the other branches of government to do a
better job in carrying out their responsibilities under the Constitu-
tion. By properly contenting itself with the decision of actual cases
or controversies at the instance of someone suffering distinct and
palpable injury, the judiciary leaves for the political branches the
generalized grievances that are their responsibility under the Con-
stitution. Far from an assault on the other branches, this is an in-
61. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1201.
62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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sistence that they are supreme within their respective spheres,
protected from intrusion-however welcome or invited-of the
judiciary.
Separation of powers is a zero-sum game. If one branch un-
constitutionally aggrandizes itself, it is at the expense of one of the
other branches. Dean Nichol loses sight of this reality in criticizing
Justice Scalia's invocation of the "take Care" clause of Article II.
According to Dean Nichol, "a challenged legislative or judicial
action either unconstitutionally abrogates executive power or it
does not. It should make little difference what sort of plaintiff
seeks to trigger the incursion."'6 The Article III standing require-
ment that the judiciary act only at the behest of a plaintiff suffer-
ing injury in fact, however, ensures that the court is carrying out
its function of deciding a case or controversy, rather than fulfilling
the executive's responsibility of taking care that the laws be
faithfully executed. We accept the judiciary's displacement of the
democratically elected branches when necessary to decide an actual
case; Dean Nichol would seem to make a virtue of this necessity
by jettisoning the injury in fact requirement for Article III stand-
ing.
Standing is an apolitical limitation on judicial power. It re-
stricts the right of conservative public interest groups to challenge
liberal agency action or inaction, just as it restricts the right of
liberal public interest groups to challenge conservative agency
action or inaction.64 It precludes Congress from assigning a right
to sue to those without injury whether the statutory interest sought
to be judicially enforced is perceived as liberal or conservative.
The relatively recent growth of conservative public interest groups,
and the even more recent change in presidential administrations,
should set the stage for rethinking the facile assumption that
standing cloaks a political agenda. It does derive from and pro-
mote a conception that judicial power is properly limited in a
democratic society. That leaves greater responsibility to the po-
63. See Nichol, supra note 4, at 1163-64.
64. As one commentator has noted, "courts favorably disposed toward the New Deal
reformation developed doctrines of standing, ripeness, and reviewability largely to insulate
agency decisions from judicial intervention. Such doctrines were used enthusiastically by
judges associated with the progressive movement and the New Deal, most prominently
Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter . . . .This view has enjoyed a kind of renaissance in
recent years, though from judges with a quite different political orientation." Sunstein,
supra note 23, at 1437-38.
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litical branches of government-however they are inclined. To the
extent that is a political agenda, it is the one the Framers en-
shrined in the Constitution.
Professor Pierce makes a subtler point. He argues that the
Court's standing jurisprudence favors regulated entities over those
who benefit from regulation; because the former can readily show
concrete injury while the latter will have a more difficult time
doing so.6' The extent to which this may distort judicial interven-
tion in the administrative process, however, should not be exagger-
ated.66 The Court has not revisited the proposition that
"[a]esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-be-
ing, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society,
and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by
the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving
of legal protection through the judicial process." 67
What the Court has done is rule, for example, that a plaintiff
who alleges only that she uses land "in the vicinity of" a
2,000,000-acre area--only 4500 acres of which are affected by the
challenged action-has not adequately shown that she is among
those injured by the action,' and that a plaintiff who alleges. she
might visit certain areas sometime in the future has not shown
injury from an agency's failure to consult about possible effects of
funding decisions on endangered species in that area.69 Far from
indicating "a transformation in the law of standing,' 70 such deci-
sions are a natural response to efforts to render the standing limi-
tations meaningless.
The consequences of accepting the proposition that injury in
fact is not an Article III limitation on federal court jurisdiction
65. Pierce, supra note 5, at 1194-95.
66. See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1478 (noting "any such limitations [on con-
gressional power to grant standing] should come up infrequently even if they exist").
67. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). Relying on "liberal federal
pleading standards," the Court also has allowed plaintiffs to amend complaints found to
contain inadequate allegations of injury. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
377-78 (1982). This is not to say that plaintiffs may continually reformulate their theory
of standing. See Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 843, 877 n.2 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc) (Silberman, J.) ("A lawsuit is not a continuing dialogue with the judiciary in which
a party may try different theories of standing until one succeeds."), reh'g granted and
opinion vacated, 856 F.2d 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
68. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 886-87, 889 (1990).
69. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1992).
70. Nichol, supra note 4, at 1142.
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ought to give one pause. Under such a view, Congress would be
free to pass a statute conferring certain responsibilities on an agen-
cy with no more guidance than that which the extremely broad
delegation doctrine requires. 1 Congress also could specify that
any person who wants to sue the agency in federal court may do
so if he believes the agency is not living up to its mandate. Such a
state of affairs would transform the courts into ombudsmen of the
administrative bureaucracy, a role for which they are ill-suited
both institutionally and as a matter of democratic theory. The
Court's recognition that injury in fact is a requirement of Article
III ensures that the courts will more properly remain concerned
with tasks that are, in Madison's words, "of a Judiciary nature."'72
71. The Court has explained that Congress need do no more than lay down an "in-
telligible principle" to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine. See Touby v. United States, 111
S. Ct. 1752, 1756 (1991); Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218-19
(1989); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers,
1991 Sup. Cr. REv. 225, 246-47.
72. 2 RECORDS, supra note 18, at 430.
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